
/ 



GENERAL POPE'S 

Virginia Campaign 

< of 1862. 



LEWIS ESTE MILLS 






i 



.■" '( 




n 



Book_{^,|^^ 



V 



/0~^) 



GENERAL POPE'S 



Virginia Campaign 



of 1862. 



READ BEFORE 



|,!|e l^iwiiiKali |[tterar| mA 



FehT-bucLTy <§, 1&70. 



LEWIS ESTE MILLS 



CINCINNATI: 

ROBERT CLARKE & CO 
1870. 



GENEEAL POPE'S 
Virginia Campaign of 1862. 



The summer of 1862 was creeping away. The 
army which had slowly advanced from the Quaker guns 
of Manassas, through Yorktown, toward Richmond, 
had been bearino; witness with its blood of its willina;- 
ness, its ability, and its desire to destroy the army of 
the rebels and occupy their capital, and was now slowly 
diminishing by sickness, while its commander slept and 
the enemy gathered strength. 

For a year had the Republic wearily waited for the 
promised success of the Army of the Potomac — wearily 
waited, and wondered why. 

It was determined to unite all the forces north of 
the Peninsula under one command, in order, by threat- 
ening the enemy from the north, and thus diverting their 
attention, to enable McClellan to accomplish the object 
of his campaign. 

In consequence of this determination, the Govern- 
ment sent for General John Pope, who had greatly dis- 
tinguished himself by his operations in the West, and 
on the 26th of June assigned him to the command of 
Army of Virginia, numbering in all about 40,000 men. 

The objects of the campaign were to be. First. The 
protection of Washington ; and. Secondly. The relief of 
the Army of the Potomac by operations upon the enemy's 

(3) 



4 General Pope's 

lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville 
and Charlottesville. 

Two days afterward McClellan commenced his 
retreat to the James River, thus placing the whole rebel 
army between his own and the small force of Pope, 
and, of course, rendering different plans necessary. 

General Pope proceeded immediately to concen- 
trate his forces, stationing Sigel (in command of Fre- 
mont's corps) at Sperryville; Banks, six or eight miles 
east of him, and McDowell at Waterloo Bridge, on the 
pike leading from Sperryville to Warrenton, General 
King's division of McDowell's corps being left, by orders 
from Washington, at Fredericksburg. 

He wrote to General McClellan, at Harrison's 
Landing, asking his views and offering cordial coopera- 
tion. The former were not given nor the latter prom- 
ised. It became apparent that the appointment of an 
officer superior to the leaders of both armies was advisable, 
and General Halleck was placed in general command. 

Appreciating the absolute necessity that the leaders 
of the two armies should act in concert, and made to 
fear, by the reception of the advances before mentioned 
to McClellan, that danger might ensue from the con- 
tinuance of both in command, General Pope asked to 
be relieved and returned to the West. His request 
was not granted, however. 

In the meantime various expeditions were sent out 
to operate upon the enemy's lines. Orders had been 
also issued that the neighbors upon the lines of the 
railroads should be responsible for the safety of the 
roads; that the troops should subsist upon the country 
in which their operations should be carried on, furnish- 
ing vouchers, payable to loyal owners at the conclusion of the 
war ; and for the arrest and sending within the rebel 



Virginia Campaign. 



lines of all who refused to take the oath of allegiance 
to the United States. 

The necessity and propriety of these orders will 
be well understood by any one who has read of the 
difficulty of carrying on our operations in the midst of 
a disaffected population, and are attested by the bitter- 
ness of the retaliatory orders of the enemy thus deprived 
of the aid of its friends in our rear. 

July 29. General Pope left Washington to take 
command in the field, and on the 7th of August all 
the infantry and artillery, except King's division of 
McDowell's corps, which was left at Fredericksburg by 
orders from Washington, were posted along the turnpike 
from Sperryville, numbering about 28,500 men, and the 
next day, on the receipt of rumors of the enemy's cross- 
ing the Rapidan, were concentrated at Culpepper. 

August 9. Banks was sent forward to Cedar Moun- 
tain to hold the enemy in check ; but, advancing 
beyond the strong position he at first took, he engaged 
Jackson's force, bringing on a severe battle, in which 
we lost about 1,800 men. Jackson withdrew before 
daylight of the lOth, and on the next night (nth) 
retreated across the Rapidan toward Gordonsville, leaving 
dead and wounded on his line of march. 

In the meantime King's division came up; on the 
14th Reno joined with the Ninth Corps (Burnside's), 
numbering about 8,000 men, and the army was formed 
in line as follows : 

Right — Sigel, on Robertson's River, at the crossing 
of the road from Cedar Mountain to Orange Court-house. 

Center — McDowell, covering both flanks of Cedar 
Mountain. 

Left — Reno, near Raccoon Ford, covering road to 
Stevensburg and Culpepper. 



6 General Pope's 

On the i6th of August a letter of Lee, dated the 
preceding day at Gordonsville, to General J. E. B. Stuart, 
was captured, stating the position of the enemy and their 
design to overwhelm Pope before McClellan could come up. 
This caused Pope to withdraw behind the Rappahannock, 
and post his forces with his left at Kelly's Ford and his 
right about three miles above Rappahannock Station. 

In the meantime, August 3d, General McClellan 
had been ordered to withdraw immediately from the Pen- 
insula to Acquia Creek. Against this order he remon- 
strated, and begged for reinforcements to enable him to 
take Richmond, to which General Halleck responded, 
on the 5th of August, with a repetition of the order, 
and subsequently the movement began. 

Pope had fought his first battle, and was now lying 
behind the Rappahannock, with the full rebel force advanc- 
ing for the purpose of overwhelming him. 

On the 20th, 21st and 22d August the rebel army 
made various unsuccessful attempts to cross the river, and 
then determined to turn his right flank. He was disabled 
from moving so as to oppose them in front by his orders 
to hold on to his communication with Fredericksburg. 

August 20. Halleck telegraphs Pope: "Every effort 
must be made to hold the Rappahannock. Large forces 
will be in to-morrow." And on the 21st: "General 
Cox's forces are coming on from Parkersburg, and will be 
here to-morrow and the next day. Dispute every inch of 
ground, and fight like the devil till we can reinforce you. 
Forty-eight hours more, and we can make you strong 
enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it." 

General Pope's dispatches are continuous during 
these trying days, showing his endeavors to hold the line 
of the Rappahannock, and his knowledge that the enemy 
was flankino; his right. 



Virginia Campaign. 7 

A movement across the river, to attack the enemy's 
flank and rear, was stopped by a storm and consequent 
rise of the stream. 

The enemy moving on by Sulphur Springs toward 
Waterloo, it became necessary for General Pope, in order 
to protect himself against the flanking movement, to move 
also in that direction. 

News came from General Halleck that the rein- 
forcements so needed by this small army, already depleted 
by fighting and straggling (which latter was the cause 
of great anxiety and of complaint to headquarters even 
so early as that), would begin to arrive at Warrenton on 
the 24th ; that 30,000 were en route^ and more expected. 

Moreover, finding that holding on to the line of the 
Rappahannock longer, meant the abandonment of the 
road from Warrenton to Washington, and leaving open 
the route through Thoroughfare Gap, toward which 
Jackson was pushing, as well as all other roads north 
of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, Pope determined 
to form along the pike between Warrenton and Gaines- 
ville. 

It was now the night of the 25th, and no reinforce- 
ments had reached him except General Reynolds, with 
2,500 Pennsylvania Reserves, and General Kearney, with 
4,500 of Heintzelman's corps. 

Expecting the reinforcements stated would have been 
already at Gainesville, Warrenton, and Manassas Junc- 
tion, Jackson's threatened movement through Thorough- 
fare Gap was not a cause for uneasiness, but the reinforce- 
ments had not arrived and Jackson was coming upon our 
rear. 

Keeping in mind the necessity of covering Wash- 
ington, immediately it was determined to abandon the line 
of the Rappahannock, turn our whole force in the direction 



8 General Pope's 

of Gainesville and Mariassas Junction, and interposing 
between Jackson and Lee, crush the former, and then turn 
upon Lee's front beyond Bull Run, 

For nine days the troops had been incessantly marching 
and fighting, were worn with loss of sleep and irregular 
and insufficient food, and reduced by losses, by sickness 
and by straggling, so that they numbered only about 
36,500, besides the corps of Heintzelman and Porter, 
numbering about 18,000, which had reached Warrenton 
Junction, ill provided with material or ammunition. 

In this condition began the march to capture Jackson, 
which continued through the 27th and 28th. On the 
evening of the latter, McDowell, marching toward Cen- 
treville, came upon Jackson's advance retreating to Thor- 
oughfare Gap, and a severe action took place. On the 
29th, attack was made at daylight by Sigel, assisted by 
Hooker and Kearney, and Jackson, closely pursued, fell 
back to a strong position, covered by an unfinished rail- 
road embankment. Severe skirmishing went on all day. 
McDowell and Porter had been ordered to come up and 
fall upon the enemy's flank. 

At 3 A. M. Porter had been ordered to move at dawn 
and report immediately, as " a severe engagement is likely 
to take place, and your presence is necessary." 

At 4I p. M. Porter not having moved, a peremptory 
order was sent him to "push forward into action at once 
on the enemy's (right) flank." About 5I p. M. Heintzel- 
man and Reno, assaulting the enemy's left, doubled it upon 
the center, and continued to push Jackson back until about 
8 o'clock in the evening, but Porter failed to appear. The 
forces of Jackson were being rapidly reinforced, and the 
battle which General Reno described as one of the best 
planned of the war, failed of its desired result of capturing 
the enemy's force on account of want of assistance. 



Virginia Campaign. 



Retreat was rendered necessary. One more fierce 
attack upon the rapidly recruited enemy, one more bloody 
check to their advance, one more well-fought battle by the 
wornout troops, and on the night of the 30th the army 
retreated in good order and unpursued to Centreville. 

In the mean time the trains had retreated, under the 
charge of General Banks, to Centreville, without loss. 

On the 31st, the men were rested and refreshed. 

On September ist, one more severe attack was made by 
the enemy and repulsed, and on the 2d the army was with- 
drawn without interruption by the enemy, to Washington, 
and thus ended the campaign. After which General Pope 
was relieved at his own request. 



In order to clearly understand this episode of the war, 
which has been so little understood and so shamefully mis- 
represented, it is necessary to comprehend : 

1st. What were the objects of the campaign. 

2d. What was the force provided for accomplishing 
these objects. 

3d. How it was that Jackson, who had separated him- 
self from Lee, was not crushed before succor could arrive. 

4th. Why the aid promised was not cordially and 
promptly afforded. 

It has been repeatedly stated and widely credited that 
the object of the campaign was the capture of Richmond, 
and that to enable Pope to accomplish this, reinforcements 
were offered as freely to him as McClellan claimed they 
had been persistently denied to the army of the Penin- 
sula — but that outflanked, surprised, confused, unable to 
manage his unwieldy forces, he had been compelled by an 
inferior force to retreat until his retreat became a rout, 
and with loss of baggage and of discipline, the army of 



lo General Popes 

Virginia, reinforced by the whole Potomac army of 90,000, 
rushed, a disorderly mass, behind the entrenchments of 
Washington, whence in a itw days they were led to vic- 
tory by General McClellan. 

Indeed, the latter says in his official report " that I 
lost no time that could be avoided in moving the army of 
the Potomac from the Peninsula to the support of the army 
of Virginia ; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarka- 
tion of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and 
Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the 
mass of my army had sailed ; and that after my arrival at 
Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to foriuard 
supplies and reinforcements to General Pope. I sent with the 
troops that moved, all the cavalry that I could get hold of 
Even my personal escort was sent out on the line of the 
railway as a guard, with the provost and camp guard at 
headquarters, retaining less than one hundred men, many 
of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, etc.; 
all the headquarters' teams that arrived were sent out with 
supplies and ammunition, none being retained even to move 
the headquarters' camp." 



This subject I propose to examine, and first to show 
the objects of the campaign. 

I have already stated these to be the protection of 
Washington and the Shenandoah valley, and the attraction 
of the attention of the Rebel army from the army of the 
Potomac. Fortunately we have clear and undeniable tes- 
timony to the truth of this in the sworn evidence of Gen- 
eral Pope before the committee on the Conduct of the 
War, given on the 8th July, 1862, twelve days after he 
was assigned to the command, and twenty-one days before 
he took personal command in the field. 



Virginia Campaign. 1 1 

In this he states his intention to constantly attack and 
harass the enemy upon any advance, and his conviction 
that he could prevent them from coming to Washington, 
and that he did not feel justified in attempting to march upon 
Richmond under the circumstances, because he was " made 
responsible for the security of the city, and the enemy 
would be able to come out and overwhelm the small force 
I have before General McClellan's army would be able to 
hear or know anything about it." 

So much for the objects of the campaign. Next as to 
the forces under his command. The consolidated morning 
report of July 31st, 1862, shows a total force of 47,878 ; 
from this, however, must be deducted 6,500, as it appears 
from the report of General Banks, made after the battle of 
Cedar Mountain, that his corps, instead of about 14,500, 
as reported, numbered but about 8,000. This would leave 
about 41,000 troops. Of these, King's division of Mc- 
Dowell's corps was left at Fredericksburg, and did not 
come up until the 1 2th August. The campaign begun, 
therefore, with (in round numbers) 30,000 men, including 
cavalry and artillery. 

If General McClellan at the head of the 90,000 left 
after the retreat to Harrison's Landing, could not advance 
upon Richmond without 30,000 to 35,000 fresh troops 
(Halleck's letter to McClellan, August 6th), it could not 
be expected that General Pope, at the head of only that 
30,000 could successfully resist the Rebel forces, much less 
take Richmond, unless he were reinforced by the whole of 
McClellan's 90,000. This, as we have seen, the latter 
says was done, and as rapidly as possible. Let us see. 

August 3. The order to McClellan to move to 
Acquia Creek was issued. 

August 4. It was repeated. 

August 9. (The day on which the battle of Cedar 



12 General Pope's 

Mountain was fought), Halleck telegraphs McClellan : 
"I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces 
in front of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he 
expects to crush them and move forward to the Potomac. 
You must send reinforcements instantly to Acquia Creek. 
Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, 
your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all 
possible dispatch." 

August 10. Again : "The enemy is crossing the Rap- 
idan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to- 
day. There must be no further delay in your movements." 

On the 30th July orders had been sent to McClellan 
to remove his sick as quickly as possible. General 
McClellan's dispatches complain of Halleck's injustice 
and impossibility of moving faster. On the 7th August 
he reports 3,740 sick moved (in eight days), ^'■including some 
that are embarked to-night, and will leave to-morrow 
morning," leaving about 5,700 still on hand. 

August 7. Five batteries of artillerv were embarked. 

August 10. One regiment of cavalry. 

August II. One brigade of infantry. 

August 12. McClellan telegraphs Halleck: "It is 
not possible for any one to place this army where you wish 
it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington 
is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to 
save it; it is in much better position to do so from here 
than from Acquia. Our inater'ial can only he saved by using 
the whole army to cover it if lue are pressed. If sensibly 
weakened by detachments, the result might be the loss of 
much material and many men." 

Take the capital of the country if you must, and 
destroy the army that defends it, but spare my baggage, 
which I need my whole army to protect ! 

At last, "on the 14th and 15th, two army corps were 



Virginia Campaign. 



put in motion toward Fort Monroe," and a dispatch was 
sent, "Movement has commenced by land and water. 

* * * I don't like Jackson's movements." 

August i\. Halleck telegraphs again : "The forces of 
Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as 
rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself, as soon as you 
can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of 
ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. 
Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land." 

Same day McClellan answers : " Franklin is here. 

* * * / had already ordered all the ammunition for- 
wardy 

Same day : " I have ample supplies of ammunition 
for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. / 
can supply any deficiencies that may exist in General Papers 
armyT 

August 23. Franklin's corps sailed. 

August 27. Halleck telegraphs : " Porter is march- 
ing on Warrenton Junction, to reinforce Pope. Nothing 
said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle 
imminent. Franklin's corps should move out hy forced 
marches." 

Whereupon McClellan ordered Franklin to march at 
once to the imminent battle reported by Porter? No, but 
to prepare to march, and report in person to him at Alex- 
andria, concerning his transportation ; and two hours later 
telegraphs: "My aid has just returned from Franklin's 
camp. Reports that Generals Franklin, Smith and Slocum 
are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in 
rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once." 

One hour later: "Can Franklin, without his artillery 
or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front ? / do not see 
that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with 



14 General Pope's 

Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we 

SAFE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE VaLLEY ? 

Again, at 6 P. M.: "I have just received the copy of 
a dispatch from General Pope to you, dated at lo a. m. 
to-day, in which he says: 'AH forces now sent forward 
should be sent to my right at Gainesville.' I have now at 
my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, 
about 2,800 of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel 
Tyler's First Connecticut Artillery. ''' ''" ''' If you 
wish me to order any portion of this force to the front (eight 
hours after the order that Franklin should move out by 
forced marches), it is in readiness to march at a ?notnenfs 
notice." 

August 28. Halleck ordered Franklin, by direct dis- 
patch to him, to move toward Manassas. 

To this McClellan, not Franklin, answers: "I think 
the enemy is in so much force near Manassas as to make 
it necessary for us to move in force." 

Again, on same day, Halleck telegraphs: "Not a 
moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as pos- 
sible toward Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope 
before the enemy is reinforced." 

Same day, 4:10 P. M, (thirty hours after the order for 
forced marching, and twenty-two hours after stating that 
13,000 men were in readiness to march at a moment's 
notice), McClellan telegraphs: "General Franklin is with 
me here. We are not yet in a condition to move ; may 
be by to-morrow morning." 

Same day, 4:45 p. M., he telegraphs : " Neither Frank- 
lin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and 
fight a battle." 

To which Halleck replies: "They must go to-mor- 
row morning, ready or not ready." 

August 29, 10:30 A. M. McClellan telegraphs: 



Virginia Campaign. ir 

"Franklin's corps is in motion. Started about 6 a. m. 
* * "■'' I should not have moved him but for your pressing 
order of last night" 

August i<^., 12 M. McCIellan telegraphs: "Franklin 
has only between io,000 and ii,000 for duty. How far 
do you wish this force to advance?" 

Unable to correctly resolve this in his own mind, and 
concluding, to use the language of his official report, 
that ''it would have been very injudicious to have pushed 
Franklin's small force beyond Annandale," and probably 
still uncertain whether it was safe in the direction of the 
Valley, he halted them at that place, and asked at i p. m. : 
" Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this 
vicinity, including Franklin ? " 

At 3 p. M. Halleck replied: "I want Franklin's 
corps to go far enough to find out something about the 
enemy." 

At 8 P. M. McCIellan says: "/if was not safe for 
Franklin to move beyond Annandale under the circum- 
stances. * '^ ''^ Please give distinct orders in reference 
to Franklin's movements to-morrow." 

At 10 P. M.: "• I have sent orders to Franklin to 
place himself in communication with General Pope as 
soon as possible." 

Thus, Franklin on the night of the third day, after 
orders to move by forced marches, had advanced as far as 
Annandale, six miles from Alexandria. 

Why he did not move on the 27th, 28th and 29th 
was, McCIellan says, because he was without transportation 
for supplies and ammunition. Gen. Halleck's dispatch of 
August 30th, says: "The quartermaster's department 
would have given him plenty of transportation if he had 
applied for it any time since his arrival at Alexandria." 

August 30. McCIellan again asks concerning the 



I 6 General Pope's 

route for the troops to take, and Halleck answers : " Send 
the troops where the fighting is;" and two hours later — 
" they must use their legs and make forced marches. 
Time now is everything." 

Realizing this fact, by super-human exertions, the 
corps of Franklin and Sumner were forwarded at last and 
reached Centreville, but a ^ew miles distant from Alex- 
andria, on the night of the 30th August, after the cam- 
paign was over, the enemy reinforced with all his army, 
and the opportunity for giving a blow to the enemy, from 
which he not only could not have easily recovered, but 
would have enabled us to follow up the advantage, in all 
probability, with the speedy capture of Richmond. 

By this time the sole reinforcements received from the 
Army of the Potomac were: Reynolds' Pennsylvania 
Reserves, 2,500; Heintzelman's and Porter's corps, num- 
bering together, say 18,000. In all, 20,500. 

Of these, Porter's corps refused to fight until the 
30th, so that from the 4th August until that day Pope's 
army fought the whole campaign unsupported, except by 
Reynolds and Heintzelman, and on that day by Porter. 
The only fighting after that was on the ist September, 
which was carried on entirely by the forces he had before 
Porter assisted him. 

Ninety thousand men made up the Army of the 
Potomac. Where were the remaining seventy 

THOUSAND ? 



I have said that Porter refused to fight his corps until 
the 30th. At 3 A. M., on the 29th, as I have before 
stated he was ordered to move at dawn, but did not do so. 

On the morning of the 29th he received the 
order to move forward to Gainesville direct. He had 



Virginia Campaign. ly 

then been reinforced by Piatt's brigade of Sturgis' 
division, and had about 12,000 men, containing nearly all 
the regular army, and eight batteries of artillery. Its 
march that day and the day previous had been but a fevi^ 
miles. He and McDowell marched together toward the 
scene of action. The latter pushed on and took part. 
The former halted and stacked arms, and sometime later 
in the day wrote to McDowell and King : " The enemy 
are in strong force on this road, and as they appear to have 
driven our forces back, the firing of the enemy having 
advanced, and ours' retired, I have determined to with- 
draw to Manassas. The advancing masses of dust show 
the enemy coming in force," 

At this time, against orders, knowing as he says, that 
our army of worn out men, not three times in number of 
his own corps, was being worsted in the battle, which was 
raging in his front, he deemed it safe to retire to Manas- 
sas. 

At 4:30 p. M. the order for him to " push forward 
into action at once on the enemy's flank and if possible on 
his rear" was sent and received by him at 5 p. m. The 
efFect of the order upon him was to make him stay for 
very shame, but not to obey. It was not sufficient to 
make him fling himself like a soldier into the fray where 
his friends were falling fast, and turn the tide of battle 
with his splendid fresh reserve of nearly one-third of the 
army. It was not enough to rouse him to action — it 
simply caused him to sit down by the wayside and wish the 
enemy had not been strong enough to drive our men back. 
If they had been retreating it would have been safe to 
advance. Halt then and reflect — "the advancing masses 
of dust show the enemy coming in force." 

But the orders — they are disobeyed already — and how 
do I know that they are judicious if obeyed \ The duty 
2 



1 8 General Papers 

of a soldier — it has beerl forgotten so long that a few hours 
will make no difference. The duty of a citizen of the 
Republic — that is forgotten. 

Honor. — "What is honor? A word. What is that 
word — honor? Air. A trim reckoning! Who hath it? 
He that died o' Wednesday. Doth he feel it ? No. 
Doth he hear it ? No. Is it insensible, then ? Yea, to 
the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. 
Why ? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll 
none of it. Honor's a mere escutcheon, and so ends my 
catechism." 

Catechism said, what hinders sound sleep until the 
morrow ? Not the crime committed, nor the battle lost in 
consequence thereof. 

Before closing this portion of the subject I beg to call 
attention to the following extracts from an article by Gen- 
eral Strother, in Harper's Magazine for November, 1867: 

August 27. Messengers had been dispatched to hasten the 
march of Fitz John Porter, who was behind with his fresh and 
veteran corps. These troops are expected to reach us by day- 
light, to replace Hooker, in case the enemy attack in that direc- 
tion. McDowell, with his own and Sigel's command, over 
30,000 men, are to move from Warrenton in the morning and 
fall upon Jackson before Lee with the main body of the Rebel 
army can support him. These orders carried out, and we will 
make Jackson pay dearly for his dinner and night's frolic at 
Manassas. 

August 28. General Porter, who was expected to be up 
during the night, did not arrive until 10 a. m. There is much 
indignant comment among the staff officers on this dangerous 
delay. =!« * I vvas sent back with a message to Generals Por- 
ter, Hooker and Heintzelman, ordering them to move their com- 
mands on Manassas without delay. I found Porter at Bristoe and 
delivered the message. 



Virginia Campaign. ig 

August 29. At three o'clock this morning I was aroused 
by Colonel Ruggles in person to carry written orders to Gen- 
eral Fitz John Porter, supposed to be lying at Manassas Junction, 
or alternately at Bristoe. The combat we had witnessed last 
evening was between King's division of McDowell's corps, and 
a portion of Jackson's command. The fight was sharp and 
sanguinary, but without decisive results. Kearney, having driven 
out the enemy's rear guard, occupied Centreville. It was under- 
stood that McDowell's command occupied a position which cut 
Jackson off from the main body of the rebel army. There will 
doubtless be a sanguinary battle to-day. Porter's orders are to 
move on Centreville without delay. * * It was broad day- 
light when I reached Porter's quarters at Bristoe. While he 
coolly read it over — (the dispatch) — I noted the time by his 
watch, which marked five o'clock and twenty minutes, precisely. 

And after the close of the day he adds : 

Porter, who received the order, carried by myself this morn- 
ing, at sunrise to move on Centreville, and a second order at 
Manassas, turning his course toward Groveton, has shown no dis- 
position to assist in the fight at all, but has lain quietly in sight 
and hearing of the battle all the afternoon. 

A jury of his peers tried and condemned him to be 
cashiered and forever forbidden to hold any olBce of trust 
or profit under the United States Government. 

It is generally asserted, and the impression is sedu- 
lously cultivated by Porter and his friends, that he was 
cashiered for disobedience of orders simply, and that it was 
a hard sentence for doing only as so many others did with- 
out any punishment therefor. 

But this is entirely incorrect. He was indeed found 
guilty of disobedience of orders, but the chief charge 
against him was as follows : 



20 General Pope's 

" Charge 2. Violation of the Fifty-Second Article of War. 

''Specification i. In this: That the said Major General 
Fitz John Porter, during battle of Manassas, on Friday the 
29th of August, 1862, while within sight of the field and in full 
hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major General Pope, 
his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order to attack the 
enemy in the following figures and letters, to-wit : 

•"Headquarters in the Field, Aug. 29, 1862 — 4:30 p. m. 
" * Major General Porter : 

" Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right 
flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the 
enemy's flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in 
communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed 
in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you 
engage his flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, 
keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are 
obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear so as to keep 
you in close communication with the right wing. 

"♦(Signed) JOHN POPE, 

" ' Major General Commanding.' 

*' Which said order the said Major General Porter did then 
and there shamefully disobey, and did retreat from advancing 
forces of the enemy without any attempt to engage them, or to 
aid the troops that were already fighting greatly superior num- 
bers and were relying on the flank attack he was thus ordered to 
make to secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's 
army, a result which must have followed from said flank attack, 
had it been made by the said General Porter, in compliance with 
the said order which he so shamefully disobeyed. This at or 
near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of 
August, 1862. 

" Specification 2. In this : That the said Major General 
Fitz John Porter, being with his army corps, on the 29th of 
August, 1862, between Manassas Station and the field of battle 
then pending between the forces of the United States and those 
of the rebels, and within sound of the guns, and in presence of 



Virginia Campaign. ii 

the enemy, and knowing that a severe action was being fought, 
and that the aid of his corps was greatly needed, did fail all day 
to bring it on the field, and did shamefully fall back and retreat 
from the advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them 
battle, and without knowing the forces from which he shamefully 
retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, 
on the 29th of August, 1862. 

" Specif cation 3. In this : that the said Major General Fitz 
John Porter, being with his army corps near the field of battle 
at Manassas, on the 29th of August, 1862, while a severe action 
was being fought by the troops of Major General Pope's com- 
mand, and being in the belief that the troops of the said General 
Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, did 
shamefully fail to go to the aid of the said troops and General, 
and did shamefully retreat away and fall back with his army to 
the Manassas Junction and leave to the disasters of a presumed 
defeat the said army, and did fail by any attempt to attack the 
enemy to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would 
have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. This 
at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th 
of August, 1862." 

The second and third specifications leave out of view 
all orders received ; and try him, and convict him, and 
condemn him for unsoldierly, cowardly, or treasonable 
conduct in the presence of the enemy, which, as I have 
shown you, he himself admits. 

From that sentence he is now seeking to be relieved 
and restored to his rank in the army. 

The court which tried him was composed of such 
men as Generals Hunter, Hitchcock, King, Ricketts, and 
Garfield, and the trial was conducted by Judge Advocate 
General Holt, and we learn from the official report of the 
trial that " Major General Fitz John Porter, having heard 
the order appointing the court read, was asked if he had 



22 General Pope's 

any objection to any member named in the detail, and 
replied he had no objection." 

And, before the trial, General Porter's counsel, Rev- 
erdy Johnson, said to a high officer of the government : 
"We have seen the detail of the court, and General Por- 
ter is perfectly satisfied with it. He regards them all as 
men of the highest honor and integrity." After the trial, 
and before the verdict of the court was known, Mr. John- 
son said to General Halleck : "Whatever may be the 
result, neither General Porter nor his friends can have 
any ground of complaint against the court. I consider the 
trial to have been perfectly fair." 

He has since published a pamphlet at Morristown, N. 
J., entitled "Appeal to the President of the United States," 
in which he bitterly attacks the report of the trial by Gen- 
eral Holt, charges that President Lincoln w^s by that mis- 
led to confirmation of the unanimous sentence of the court, 
and endeavors to excuse his conduct by attempting to show 
that if he had engaged the enemy he would have been 
defeated — or in other words, that it was not safe to do so. 
It is scarcely worth while to say more of this production 
than that it opens with an opinion of George B. McClellan, 
and ends with a letter from W. B. Franklin, and that both 
are quite as sure that Porter was clearly right and Pope as 
clearly wrong as they were before the campaign commenced. 
United in desire, in action they are not divided. 

It is charged against General Sherman that he recom- 
mends the granting of Porter's request. The truth of the 
matter is that, as traitors and rebels are now relieved from 
political disabilities, so is he willing that Porter should be 
relieved to that extent and no further. Indeed no officer 
who regards the honor or efficiency of the army can, as it 
seems to me, recommend anything more than that, or call 
the sentence other than light. His alternative is cowardice 



Virginia Campaign. 23 

or treason on the field of battle. Fit punishment for either 
is death. 



But were the " enemy coming in force ? " Pope and 
McDowell both testified that his obedience of orders would 
have gained the day, because the flank of the enemy was 
ill protected. But Porter saw " advancing masses of dust." 
Listen to General J. E. B. Stuart's report. He says that 
on the 29th of August, he was on that flank with his cav- 
alrv and found our troops approaching. " I waited his (our) 
approach long enough to ascertain that there was at least 
an army corps, at the same time keeping detachments of cav- 
alry dragging brush down the road from the direction of 
Gainesville, so as to deceive the enemy, a ruse which Por- 
ter's report shows was successful, and notified the com- 
manding general, then opposite me on the turnpike, that 
Longstreet's flank and rear were seriously threatened, and 
of the importance to us of the ridge I held. Immediately 
upon receipt of that intelligence, Jenkin's, Kemper's, and 
D. R. Jones' brigades, and several pieces of artillery, were 
ordered to me by General Longstreet, and being placed in 
position fronting Bristoe awaited the enemy's advance. 
After exchanging a few shots with rifle pieces, this corps 
withdrew toward Manassas." 

Longstreet reports that his right being threatened he 
sent reinforcements, but " after some ^cw shots the enemy 
withdrew his forces," and the brigades sent were returned 
to resist the attack of our men which was doubling his left 
on his center. Stonewall Jackson in his official report cor- 
roborating both Stuart and Longstreet sums up the whole 
matter thus : *■' After some desultory skirmishing and heavy 
cannonading during the day, the Federal infantry about 
4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the 



24 General Pope's 

wood, and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, 
but soon extending its attack to the center and left. In a 
few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and 
sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was 
repulsed another took its place and pressed forward as if 
determined by force of numbers and fury of assault, to 
drive us from our position. So impetuous and well sus- 
tained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the 
commanding general for reinforcements, but the timely and 
gallant advance of General Longstreet on the right relieved 
my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers." 

The aid then aff'orded by Longstreet, which Porter's 
desertion enabled him to send, prevented Pope from gain- 
ing the victory. 

This general was he to whom McClellan telegraphed, 
on September ist, after the army was at Centreville, and 
all operations were over, " Major General Porter, I ask 
you, for my sake, and that of the country, and the old army 
of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the 
fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in 
all the operations now going on." 

To which the reply was perfect: "You may rest 
assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his 
country, will ever give, as they have given, to General 
Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support, in the 
execution of all orders and plans." 



Now let me call your attention to only a iew more 
dispatches, and I have done. 

On the fatal 29th of August, General Pope tele- 
graphed for supplies for his exhausted troops. To this 
General Franklin replies : " I have been instructed by 
General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the 



Virginia Campaign. 25 



available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your 
troops, and all of the cars also, as soon as you will send in 
a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train." 

Wrestling with death on the field of battle. Pope must 
send away his worn out cavalry to guard a train which would 
be loaded fol^im as soon as the cavalry should arrive ! 

Again: August 30 ; to a request for ammunition, 
comes the reply from General McClellan (who had tele- 
graphed on the 2ist that he had enough to supply any 
deficiencies in Pope's army), " I know nothing of the cali- 
bres of Pope's artillery." 

Again : August 29, 2:45 P. M. McClellan telegraphs 
President Lincoln : " I am clear that one of two courses 
should be adopted : First, to concentrate all our available 
forces to open communication with Pope (which, as we 
have seen, he resolutely and persistently failed to do). 
Second^ to leave Pope to get out of his scrape^ and at once to 
use all our means to make the capital safe." 

Recall the circumstances of the case. Pope's army, 
fighting day and night, day after day, against overwhelming 
forces, refused the promised reinforcements ; the nation 
aching for comfort ; the soldier of the forlorn hope of the 
Republic cravely accomplishing his thankless duty, and 
the commander of seventy thousand untouched men, who 
had not smelled powder for weeks, sits quietly in his tent, 
with the sound of battle filling the air, wondering whether 
it is safe toward the valley, and suggesting to the President 
to ^' leave Pope to get out of his scrape !" 

Now hot from the reading of all these official records, 
turn back and read again McClellan's report : " After my 
arrival in Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone 
to forward supplies and reinforcements to General Pope." 

And then a little further on he says : "• It will be 
remembered that at the time I was assigned to the com- 



0.6 General Pope's 

mand of the forces for the defense of the National Capital 
on the 2d day of September, 1862, the greater part of all 
the available troops were suffering under the disheartening 
influence of the serious defeat they had encountered during 
the brief and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their 
numbers were greatly reduced by casualties — their confi- 
dence was much shaken, and they had lost something of 
that esprit du corps which is indispensable to the efficiency 
of an army. Moreover they had left behind, lost or worn 
out the greater part of their clothing and camp equipage, 
which required renewal before they could be in proper con- 
dition to take the field again." 

As a comment on the latter portion of this, General 
Banks reported September 2d that all the trains had been 
brought in by him without loss. 

Again: "The army of the Potomac was recalled 
from within sight of Richmond" — after a retreat of thirty 
miles, and confessed inability to proceed — "and incorpo- 
rated with the army of Virginia." * * * a They 
fought well, faithfully, gallantly under General Pope, 
yet were compelled to fall back on Washington, defeated 
and almost demoralized," whence he led them to victory. 

Have we need of comment here ? No words of 
mine can strongly enough characterize the conduct which 
preceded the report, or the report which covered up the 
conduct. 



If we look for the cause of the conduct of McClellan, 

Porter and Franklin excusino; them from charg-es of cow- 
to to 

ardice or treason, we can discover but two : 

First. Jealousy at the appointment of a successful 
soldier to command. 



Virginia Campaign. i'] 



Second. An order issued by General Pope on taking 
command of the army in which were the following expres- 
sions : " I have come to you from the West where we have 
always seen the backs of our enemies, from an army whose 
business it has been to seek the adversary and beat him 
when found, whose policy has been attack, and not 
defense. I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain 
phrases which I am sorry to find so much in vogue among 
you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and 
holding them, and lines of retreat and bases of supplies. 
Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier 
should desire to occupy is one from which he can most 
easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the prob- 
able lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own 
to take care of themselves. Let us look before and not 
behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster 
and shame lurk in the rear." 

General Pope disclaims any intention to reflect upon 
General McClellan in this, and if there be any sting in it, 
it is to be found only in the truth of its statements, and the 
excellence of its advice heard with rejoicing by the nation, 
which was weary with waiting and sick at the heart with 
hope deferred. Viewed in the light of the attendant facts, 
and the objects of the. campaign, it was certainly well said, 
but even if it had been intended as a bitter jibe — even if 
it had been, was the proper payment to be made in lost 
battles, falling fellow-soldiers, the weeping of strong men, 
and the wan faces of widows — in danger to the Republic and 
encouragement to its foes ? 

I can not sum up the campaign better than has been 
done by General Strother, who speaks from personal 
knowledge and with authority, and, therefore, I quote hi s 
words : 



28 General Popes 

*' From this point (Cedar Mountain) until we reached the 
banks of the Potomac in front of Washington the campaign pre- 
sents a series of dashing and audacious manoeuvres and sanguinary 
combats, in which the National army lost neither honor nor 
advantage, until it closed with its powerful adversary in the cul- 
minating fight at Groveton. Up to this point our affairs wore 
an encouraging aspect, and it seemed as if General Pope's intelli- 
gent and energetic measures were about to be crowned with 
success. Jackson had made a rash adventure, and was caught in 
it. We had brought him to a stand with not over twenty-five 
thousand men, while we had sixty thousand in position to fall 
upon and crush him before his supports could possibly arrive. 
Thus, on the morning of Friday, the 29th, Lee, with the main 
body of the Southern army, was separated from Jackson by a full 
day's march, while the National troops all lay within two or 
three hours, at most, of the decisive field, with direct and open 
roads to move upon, and it must be conceded that in the contest 
of manoeuvres the Union commander had fairly out-generaled 
his adversary. Without hesitation or delay all the troops imme- 
diately under General Pope's eye were thrown upon the enemy. 
All day long the roar of musketry and cannon, like the sounding 
of a mighty gong, invited the absent to share in the feast of death 
and glory ; all day long the white battle-cloud, visible from hill 
and plain for twenty miles around, beckoned to laggard and 
skulker, to the exhausted soldier who had dropped behind his 
regiment, to the starred chieftain who may have mistaken his 
way or misunderstood his orders ; all day long the anxious com- 
mander counted the minutes, and urged his faithful legions to a 
succession of brilliant but exhausting attacks, vainly listening for 
the burst upon the enemy's right and rear which was to give us 
victory. 

Thus passed the day, and the hour, and the decisive oppor- 
tunity. Sunset on the 29th still found us with the light columns 
of Sigel, Heintzelmen, and Reno dashing against the strong and 
stubbornly-defended position of the enemy. Some of these 
indeed we had carried, doubling back Jackson's left, and holding 



Virginia Campaign. in 

a great portion of the contested field, with the enemy's dead and 
wounded in our hands ; but the combatants were too equally- 
matched in numbers, pluck, and condition to admit of our push- 
ing this advantage to a decisive conclusion. Then, long expected 
but too late, McDowell appeared, and reported his column coming 
into position on our left. Then came darkness, followed by a 
sharp but indecisive bickering of musketry between King's 
division of McDowell's and Hood's command of Longstreet's 
corps, the leading division of the enemy's reinforcing column at 
the same hour coming into position on Jackson's right. 

Porter, with his splendid corps, had never appeared on the 
field at all. Thus it was that the hopes of victory and the 
prestige of successful generalship passed from the Union com- 
mander to his adversaries. To complete the views of this day's 
operations 1 make a note of the enemy's movements, obtained 
from the most authentic sources. My principal informant, the 
chief engineer of Lee's staff, says : ' On the morning of the 29th 
General Lee took breakfast at a house west of Thoroughfare 
Gap. Riding forward rapidly they passed Longstreet moving 
through the Gap, the head of the column some short distance on 
the eastern side. They marched left in front. Hood's division 
leading. This division reached the field and formed on Jackson's 
right after sunset on the 29th, and immediately thereafter became 
engaged with a portion of McDowell's command, as before stated. 
Other portions of Longstreet's command arrived and took position 
during the night. On the morning of the 30th (Saturday), 
Longstreet's command was all up except Anderson's division, 
which had not yet reached the field. The absence of this 
division, and a feeling of uncertainty as to Porter's forces and 
intentions, induced General Lee to remain on the defensive 
during the afternoon of Saturday. About one o'clock p. m. 
Anderson arrived, and the Rebel commander immediately com- 
menced his preparations for an aggressive movement. He was 
anticipated by Porter's attack, which, being but feebly urged, 
soon failed, and afforded the golden opportunity for the grand 
counter-attack, whose progress and results have been detailed.' " 



30 General Pope s 

This statement fully confirms my own observations, 
and sustains General Pope's theory of the situation on 
Friday, the 29th. 

What followed after the retreat to Washington, on 
the 2d of September, I quote from the Life of Lincoln^ by 
Mr. Arnold, formerly a Member of Congress from Illinois : 

" Two courses were suggested and discussed in the Cabinet 
of Mr. Lincoln. One was to place McClellan in command of 
all the forces, including both the Army of Virginia and of the 
Potomac, and the other to arrest and try him and some of his 
subordinates for disobedience and insubordination. General 
Halleck and the Secretary of War charged him with disobe- 
dience of orders, and with being responsible for the disasters 
under Pope ; and they were clearly right. 

" It was stated by at least one member of the Cabinet that 
McClellan deserved death for his repeated disobedience of orders 
and failure to reinforce Pope. He and Fitzjohn Porter must go 
down to posterity as responsible for the sacrifice of Pope and 
his army. 

" The President said to Pope, when he came to Wash- 
ington, that he had no fault to find with him ; he had faithfully 
performed his duty ; yet, yielding to the real or supposed neces- 
sities of the hour, he relieved him of his command, and placed 
the person most responsible for his disasters again at the head of 
the army. 

" On the trial of Fitz John Porter for disobedience, his 
guilt was clearly established, and the evidence of the complicity 
of his superior (McClellan) was scarcely less clear. General 
McClellan was never placed on trial, because the Government, 
with a knowledge of the facts, gave him a new command, and 
the gallant Army of the Potomac fought and won the battle of 
Antietam, and this, to some extent, condoned his great offense." 

Why General McClellan was reinstated has been 
thus told by Dr. Draper, in his able History of the Civil 
War: -'Though there was never purer patriotism than 



Virgi7iia Campaign. oi 



that which animated the soldiers of the Army of the 
Potomac, that army had been brought, through the influ- 
ence of officers who surrounded General McCIellan, into 
a most dangerous condition — dangerous to the best inter- 
ests of the nation — of having a wish of its own, and that 
wish in opposition to the convictions of the Government. 
In armies it is but a short step from the possession of a 
wish to the expression of a will. Perhaps at no period of 
the war were thoughtful men more deeply alarmed for the 
future of the nation than when they heard of the restora- 
tion of McCIellan to command, and recognized the unmis- 
takable constraint under which the Government had acted. 
* * * Lincoln was ostensibly reconciled to 

the reinstating of McCIellan, by the circumstance that he, 
of all the Generals, was most familiar with the defenses 
of Washington. What with fatigue, disappointment and 
anxiety, Halleck's health was almost broken down." 



I have shown you, entirely from official records, 
what were the objects of the campaign, viz : To protect 
Washington and bring in safely the Army of the Potomac ; 
and that these were accomplished without the rout and 
loss of baggage, of which reports were as industriously 
circulated, and as entirely untrue, as that of the intention 
to take Richmond. 

I have shown you that the forces he set out with 
were but about the number that McCIellan required to 
reinforce his army of 90,000 men, in order to advance on 
Richmond ; that, with the exception of about 10,000 men 
none reached him from the Army of the Potomac, before 
the end of the campaign, except Porter's superb corps, 
which its commander says he marched to the rear to 
the sound of the victorious enemy's cannon, and (having 
defeated the great opportunity offered of cutting off Jack- 



32 General Pope's 



son) only consented to allow to take part in the battle of 
the 30th, and even then but feebly. 

I have shown you that by the delay, which can hardly 
be otherwise construed than as willfully criminal, of Mc- 
Clellan, Porter, and Franklin, not only the opportunity of 
the 29th was lost, but that the advance of Lee, who with- 
out Jackson's aid would have been compelled to retreat, 
was rendered possible, and the bloody battles of South 
Mountain and Antietam were made necessary. 

In a word I have shown you that a campaign under- 
taken for a purpose likely to be misunderstood, was entirely 
successful in its accomplishment and missed of brilliant 
success simply by the withholding of assistance which can 
only be accounted for upon the theory of, first, cowardice 
and incompetency; secondly, either personal ambition or 
petty jealousy, which for the attainment of its ends was 
willing to risk the safety of the Republic and sacrifice its 
army; or lastly premeditated treason. 



It has been a pleasure to me to thus prove to the Club 
by indisputable facts that the record of our fellow member 
who gave us our first drill when at its first meeting after 
the fall of Fort Sumpter the Club resolved itself into a 
military company, a record so widely known by his brilliant 
capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10, has in no re- 
spect suffered by the much abused, much misrepresented, 
but successful and brilliant Virginia campaign. 

In order to confine my essay within reasonable limits, 
I have necessarily abridged far beyond my wish the state- 
ment of facts, but after careful examination I have endeav- 
ored to lay before you those which are the most prominent 
and important, withholding nothing knowingly that would 
diminish their force. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



Mil II lii llllii III III illl i III llii 

013 701 504 3 



-^"^^n 



v^-W; 






